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‘Moralising’ Welfare and Migration in Austerity Britain: A Backdrop to Brexit 
Abstract 
This article begins by examining UK government discourse on welfare and migration for the period 
2010-2016, viewed here as the expression of a distinctive process of moralisation. This discourse is 
characterised by claims to fairness, responsibility, and austerity, and explicitly sets domestic welfare 
dependency and migration in opposition to each other. Its operationalisation is traced through a formal 
mapping of civic stratification in relation to both domestic welfare and freedom of movement within 
the European Union, while also noting the absence of supporting empirical evidence. The article then 
looks to the informal aspect of civic stratification, and the role of political discourse in negatively 
shaping the moral standing of both domestic welfare recipients and EU migrants. Together with the 
uneven impact of welfare reform, their discursive opposition provides an important amplification of 
common understandings of the Brexit vote as delivered by the ‘left behind’ (Goodwin and Heath, 
2016). 
Key words: moralisation, Brexit, civic stratification 
Introduction 
The success of the Brexit vote in June 2016 was a surprise to many, not least the then Prime Minister 
David Cameron, who launched the referendum in an attempt to secure public commitment to 
membership of the European Union (EU) and resigned in the wake of the result. The present paper 
aims to provide the contextual background to a particular aspect of the Brexit vote, related to the 
political discourse of morality as fairness that has underpinned both welfare and migration policy for 
the Coalition government (2010-15) and its Conservative successor. The research question is therefore 
twofold: how did a discourse of fairness translate into an attack on an alleged ‘dependency culture’ 
within the domestic population; and how did this configuration mesh with a drive to reduce migration 
and curtail migrant access to benefits, in a manner that fuelled resistance to EU membership? 
2 
 
The paper proceeds by outlining a discourse of morality and fairness in the speeches of David 
Cameron, and tracing its operationalisation through related policy changes, notably the aggressive 
curtailment of welfare rights for both domestic claimants and EU nationals. Combined with an attack 
on the ‘abuse’ of free movement (FM), a claimed displacement of British workers, and a policy of 
deficit reduction, the effect was to place a denigrated and disadvantaged domestic population in a 
zero-sum relation to EU migration, though the driving rationale was unsupported by available 
empirical evidence. There are two strands to the analysis to follow: 1) an outline of the discursive 
content of key political speeches; and 2) the implementation of such discourse in terms of the formal 
and informal dimensions of civic stratification, a distinction that respectively refers to legal 
entitlement to rights, and to the related moral standing of affected groups. 
These two analytical strands combine to reveal a perverse effect of the discursive and policy package. 
In setting domestic welfare recipients and migrants groups in opposition, together they provide the 
context for a strong degree of Brexit support in the deprived areas most affected by welfare reform, 
but not commonly subject to high levels of inward migration. The closing section of the paper uses 
this background to amplify a particular understanding of the Brexit result, which Goodwin and Heath 
(2016:331) argue was ‘delivered by the left behind – social groups united by a general sense of 
insecurity, pessimism and marginalisation’ in what Munch (2012) has termed the ‘liberal competition 
state’. 
Welfare, migration and morality 
More broadly, this paper engages and elaborates themes from related literature on the reconfiguration 
of welfare, economy and solidarity within a changing global division of labour, underpinned by a 
distinctive moral construction of economic and social relations. In this context, Munch (2012) 
characterises the ‘liberal competition state’ as a turn away from collectivised social inclusion towards 
individualised forms, such that social provisions are subsumed under strategies of activation and 
deterrence. He notes that a key issue in this process is who succeeds in the symbolic struggle, and 
3 
 
while this struggle operates at the level of political rhetoric, it can shape the way that welfare 
problems are perceived and tackled.  
A social insurance system essentially collectivises risk, involving some acceptance of a sense of 
collective fate, and some recognition of the equal standing of participants - hence Marshall’s (1950) 
conception of citizenship as a confirmation of equal social worth. Mau (2003:45-6) argues that a 
willingness to share depends on the ‘moral persuasiveness’ of welfare institutions, but recognises that 
this is subject to a ‘politics of interpretation’.  The factors at play in terms of public acceptability are 
financial contribution, personal desert, and social belonging, raising questions as to what is fair, and 
who is worthy that have no ready answer, each being amenable to interpretation, manipulation, or 
persuasion. Hence Lockwood’s (1996:536) argument that: ‘the ethos and practice of citizenship is at 
least as likely as class relations to structure group interests and thereby fields of conflict and 
discontent.’  
Migration is clearly part of this picture, and Freeman’s (1986) classic article gives a persuasive 
account of a dynamic whereby the welfare state requires closure because ‘it establishes a principle of 
distributive justice that departs from the distributive principles of the free market’ (p52).  His 
argument is that in establishing a guaranteed social minimum welfare requires a moral grounding in 
fellow feeling, and also provides a baseline for resisting deterioration in the terms and conditions of 
employment. Foreign workers may offer an alternative to the domestic population as a supply of more 
tractable labour, but Freeman argues that this will succeed only if they can be excluded from access to 
welfare rights, or if welfare standards are more generally undermined.  
The points at issue are therefore migrants’ terms of entry and stay in the host country, the extent of 
their access to the welfare system, the degree of public acceptance of their presence, the regulation 
and buoyancy of the labour market, and how far any related erosion of domestic guarantees can be 
sustained. Many of these factors fall into the realm of political choice and influence, and the way that 
politicians may seek to embed welfare and migration within a refashioned moral vision thus 
constitutes a site of contention. Unresolved questions remain concerning the unit of membership and 
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belonging (Beitz, 1983), who is included in the ‘community of value’ (Anderson, 2013), and where 
does any related gain or loss fall  – though EU law to date has largely protected the welfare rights of 
EEA workers. As Deckard and Heslin (2016) note, there is now a significant population whose 
identities transcend national borders, and who exist alongside the deteriorating status of (lower class) 
citizens within their home nations.  
While debate has traditionally been framed in terms of the impact of migration on the welfare state 
(eg. Freeman, 1986), Geddes (2003) reverses the question. He argues that not only do resource 
pressures require a tightly defined community of membership with respect to welfare entitlement, but 
that entitlement itself is increasingly viewed in relation to immigration control. This relationship is 
driven by fears of a ‘pull factor’, such that policies to minimise welfare inclusion serve to enhance the 
possibilities for deterrence, monitoring and control. A crucial element is the classification of migrants 
by their grounds for entry (Morris, 1998; Sainsbury, 2012) and hence by immigration status, and the 
related specification of inclusions and exclusions with respect to welfare support. Marshall’s focus on 
social inclusion is thus reversed as welfare rules become part of a filtering system linked to the sorting 
of migrants by criteria of worth.  
Analysis in this mode has been advanced by the application of Lockwood’s (1996) concept of ‘civic 
stratification’, a system for the differential granting of rights shaped by underpinning judgements of 
merit or dis-merit, respectively referring to formal entitlement, and what might be termed informal 
‘moral standing’. While Lockwood’s original argument was principally concerned with the 
inequalities generated within citizenship, most notably through the construction of welfare dependents 
as a group ‘lacking in civic virtue’ (p.539), its application has been extended to include a 
consideration of migrant rights (Morris, 1997, 2002; Kofman, 2002). The concept is deployed in the 
present study to address within one frame both how citizenship is internally stratified by the measures 
of discipline and control that accompany welfare claims, and how migrants are stratified by their basis 
of entry and the associated granting or denial of rights. In each area formal legal standing and 
informal judgements of merit are shown to be in play, and in this vein Anderson (2013) notes that 
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laws on citizenship, welfare and migration create rather than reflect differential status positions. 
Together, she argues, they represent a set of social, economic and political relations that say much 
about how we make sense of ourselves.  
A number of writers (Booth, 1994; Sayer, 2007; Clarke and Newman, 2012) have addressed such 
dynamics by reformulating the notion of ‘moral economy’. Originally rooted in analysis of Britain’s 
18th century food riots (Thompson, 1971), this concept has been given contemporary relevance by the 
argument that all economies are moral economies, implying and depending upon a supporting moral 
frame. Attention has therefore turned to the production of moral sentiment in shaping socio-economic 
practice (Fassin, 2009; Sayer, 2007), and to the way that publicly circulated moral meanings offer a 
basis for generating and justifying social classification (Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013). Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in the fields of welfare and migration, where economic and moral distinctions 
become difficult to separate. The present paper therefore looks to the question of how social norms 
become the site of political intervention, and how such intervention is made apparent in political 
discourse, in the design and operation of a given policy domain, and in the shaping of public 
sentiment.  
Key questions in this exercise are how legitimacy and desert are defined with respect to welfare 
entitlement, and how far national sovereignty extends in this matter, issues highlighted by Britain’s 
assault on the welfare rights of EEA workers. While post-national migration has been linked to the 
erosion of national sovereignty and the assertion of universal rights, inclusion within the welfare 
community is carefully constrained and can provoke resistance from the domestic population, some of 
whom are themselves confined to the margins of their own society. Such tensions have been apparent 
in Britain for some time (Duevell and Jordan, 2002), but acquired particular significance in the run-up 
to the referendum on EU membership, as David Cameron sought to reform but remain in the EU. For 
a further understanding of their nature and effects, we can look to the political discourse underpinning 
the configuration of welfare and migration embraced by the 2010 Coalition government and its 
Conservative successor, and the associated impact on the moral standing of its target groups. 
6 
 
The Discourse – methods and data 
The present analysis of political discourse in this period was based on David Cameron’s party 
conference speeches, together with his more targeted welfare and immigration speeches – 24 in all. 
These texts are supplemented by cross-reference to speeches from the then Minister for Work and 
Pensions (Iain Duncan Smith), and the then Immigration Minister (Damien Green). All are listed in 
the appendix to this paper. 
Analysis of the associated discourse was informed by Freeden’s (1996; 2003) approach to mapping 
ideology, whereby ‘social truths’ depend upon the translation of abstract concepts into substantive 
content. Ideology in this context is viewed as a recurrent pattern of beliefs and values dedicated to 
(re)ordering the social world, and given expression through the communicative devices of political 
discourse. This framework directs attention to how contestable political concepts (such as morality) 
are given concrete substance or ‘decontested’ in key political statements. Associated analysis will 
therefore rest on the identification of ‘core’ concepts that are central to a given position, and the way 
their substantive content is provided by closely related (adjacent) concepts that flesh out their 
meaning – as with morality, fairness and responsibility. These in turn are amplified by more loosely 
linked ‘peripheral’ concepts that are used to give further background support.  
Examples are provided below, though in practice this process of translation does not operate 
exclusively at the conceptual level, but rather moves from greater to lesser degrees of abstraction. In 
fact, as a supplement to analysis, the resultant discourse can also be linked to social groups or 
behaviour patterns that serve as reference points for its key elements, and can be grouped in terms of 
related mutual affinities or oppositions. This is what Laclau (2014:68) terms the logic of equivalence 
and difference, or the construction of ‘equivalential chains’. We see below how such chains are made 
up of linked concepts and behaviours, and can be used to show how a discourse has the potential to 
unite or divide social groups according to their standing in relation to the key issues in play. 
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For the present paper, a thematic analysis of all the then Prime Minister’s speeches noted above was 
conducted to identify recurrent themes, and their core concepts, substantive (adjacent) content and 
more loosely associated (peripheral) content. Analysis in this mode is an interpretive rather than a 
mechanical exercise, and as in Freeden’s account requires a hierarchical approach that begins by 
identifying dominant concepts, and tracing their substantive content through threads of meaning and 
association. ‘Fairness’ stands out as a recurrent theme, appearing in a large majority of Cameron’s 
speeches, often allied with ‘morality’ and closely associated with responsibility. Thus, texts must also 
be read for proxy concepts or phrases that act together with or substitute for dominant concepts, and 
serve to frame more detailed references to specific policy issues. As we see below, addressing ‘the 
moral hazard of welfare’, tackling the ‘something for nothing culture’, linking ‘what you pay in to 
what you get out’, and ending ‘abuse’ of FM, all stand for ‘fairness’. Readings must therefore identify 
not just a recurrent vocabulary, but also recurrent meanings, which then permit a line to be drawn 
from abstract principles, to substantive content, and to promised policy change. A further step may 
look towards target audiences and implicit oppositions, often clearly signalled in political speeches – 
as with ‘hardworking British taxpayers’ (Cameron, 2014b), or more vaguely ‘putting British people 
first’ (Cameron, 2014).  
Analysing the discourse 
The analysis of discourse below proceeds chronologically, citing indicative statements that reveal an 
emergent pattern of meaning in Cameron’s key speeches. Thus, his pre-election ‘Age of Austerity’ 
speech (Cameron, 2009) announced a reshaping of Britain on the basis of responsibility, followed by 
a stated desire to ‘change the way we think about ourselves and our role in society’ (Cameron, 2010). 
These objectives were linked in 2010 and 2011 to an expanded notion of fairness, which was aimed 
not just at who gets help but ‘who gives that help through their taxes’ (Cameron, 2010), such that ‘real 
fairness...is about the link between what you put in and what you get out’ (Cameron, 2011). By the 
2012 Conservative Party Conference, Cameron had announced the related programme of welfare 
reform as a ‘moral mission’, in which ‘unfairness’ had become his first ‘great evil’ (Cameron, 2012, 
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see also 2014). An unfolding narrative now becomes apparent. In Freeden’s terms, morality emerges 
as a core concept, closely associated with the adjacent concept of fairness, contrasted with personal 
irresponsibility and social profligacy, and peripherally linked to an overriding drive for deficit 
reduction and a pledge to address the ‘something for nothing culture’ (Cameron, 2012a; Duncan-
Smith, 2013). The lines of equivalence and difference are thus drawn to associate unfairness with 
profligacy, dependency, and welfare recipients (both in-work and out-of-work), as set against 
austerity, responsibility, and hardworking taxpayers.  
However, the same set of speeches drawn on above contains a further opposition, one that offers in 
some respects to redeem the welfare recipient, and that is the opposition between migrants and the 
British people. By the time of Cameron’s 2011 conference speech immigration had become part of the 
welfare picture, and the economy inherited from New Labour was argued to have left ‘a welfare 
system that trapped millions in dependency (and) an immigration system that brought in migrant 
workers to do the jobs that those on welfare were being paid not to do.’ (Cameron, 2011; see also 
2013). So breaking the ‘cycle of dependency’ meant ‘sorting out welfare and immigration’, which in 
turn meant capping net migration. The theme was repeated in other speeches, hence: ‘Welfare and 
immigration are two sides of the same coin...we will never control immigration properly until we 
tackle welfare dependency’ (Cameron, 2011a; see also Duncan-Smith, 20111).  
The language deployed in relation to welfare reappears, but ‘fairness’ is turned to address the position 
of ‘British born people stuck on welfare’ (Cameron, 2011a), British people affected by illegal 
migration (Cameron, 2011a), communities under pressure on schools, housing2 and health care 
(Cameron, 2011a; Cameron, 2013a); and immigration that damages the labour market and pushes 
down wages (Cameron 2015). We also learn of a ‘hard-working British public’ concerned about 
migrant exploitation of services and benefits3. In these scenarios, the ‘fairness’ challenge to migrants 
is about making sure ‘you put into Britain you don’t just take out’, while the ‘fairness’ challenge for 
policy is again about protecting the British taxpayer. (Cameron, 2013a; 2014b). 
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An early focus (Cameron, 2011a; Green, 2010) was on capping non-EEA migration and ‘closing a 
loophole that allows illegals to claim benefits’4. However, attention soon turned to FM within the EU, 
and softening statements about the benefits of migration were counter-posed by ‘fairness’ as the need 
to end the ‘something for nothing culture’ among migrants. Making the case for Remain therefore 
entailed a refusal to ‘go on endlessly paying’ (Cameron, 2013a), assertions that no-one could come 
and expect benefits on arrival (Cameron, 2013b, 2014b), a promise to limit the stay of jobless EU 
migrants, and a commitment to deal with the ‘abuse of free movement’ (Cameron, 2014b; 2015a) and 
‘rogue’ EU benefit claims.5 Combined with the aim of restricting access to in-work supplements 
(currently termed Tax Credits), it was argued that this would ‘reduce the incentive for lower paid, low 
skilled EU workers to come here in the first place’ (Cameron, 2014b). 
One interesting aspect of this linkage between migration and welfare is that it places domestic welfare 
recipients in an ambiguous position; condemned by the ‘responsibility and fairness’ agenda they are 
now able to perceive themselves as subject to unfair treatment. In the name of deficit reduction, they 
are exposed to heightened conditionality, capped benefits, and frozen rates, variously applying both to 
out-of-work and in-work benefits6. This welfare austerity is then accompanied by references to 
immediate and ‘indefinite’ benefit payments for EU nationals, the contested claim7 of a 40 per cent 
rate of welfare dependency among recent arrivals (Cameron, 2015a), and assertions that immigration 
has trapped British people on benefits and driven down wages. The contours of equivalence and 
difference may now be reconfigured. British welfare recipients can potentially align themselves with 
fairness and responsibility, against the ‘abuse’ and unfairness that allegedly causes their dependency, 
to take up a position more closely allied to a legitimate claim for recognition and protection. 
Operationalising the discourse 
The translation of rhetoric into policy can be viewed through the lens of civic stratification, and 
Lockwood see sees a vital role for welfare policy in both the structuring and legitimation of 
inequalities. In terms of the discourse above we can therefore ask how espoused principles of fairness 
and responsibility are made manifest in the details of policy change from 2010 onwards. The resultant 
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measures are presented below in terms of their stratifying effects on formal entitlement, while the 
informal dimension of civic stratification is more fully addressed in a later section. 
Domestic welfare 
Although the translation of discourse into policy is not necessarily automatic or transparent, the 
discursive attack on dependency culture explicitly prepared the ground for a radical reform of the 
welfare system, via the 2012 Welfare Reform Act, and the 2016 Welfare Reform and Work Act. 
Related policy documents both anticipate and echo the speeches cited above, and prior to the 2010 
election, the Conservative Party (2008), announced its ‘responsibilities agenda’, to proclaim that 
‘ending Britain’s welfare culture is a moral duty’. This aim was repeated in a Consultation Paper 
preparatory to the 2012 Act (Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), 2010), foregrounding tighter 
conditions for unemployed claimants, while the Universal Credit system currently unfolding (DWP, 
2010a) extends conditions to people in receipt of low wage supplements.  
The reforms began to take effect well in advance of the referendum, and continue to unfold into the 
present, with a radical restructuring underway to deliver an integrated Universal Credit (UC)8 system 
of working age benefits. Its aims are to promote responsible behaviour, establish ‘fairness’ between 
givers and receivers, and impose tighter conditions on all claimants, both in and out of work (DWP, 
2010a). The policy aims are directed towards the need to accommodate a ‘modern flexible economy’ 
(Duncan-Smith 2014), which has seen a marked increase in zero hours contracts and false self-
employment (TUC, 2016). 
Such developments have been viewed as a shift in the foundations of good citizenship such that 
responsibility for social cohesion and integration falls on the individual (Soysal, 2012), but this should 
not blind us to their stratifying effects. Thus, Munch (2012:251) notes that one result of such 
individualised orientation is to produce ‘a lower class that feels no longer cared for in the national 
community’, a key referent in explanations of the Brexit vote (Goodwin and Heath, 2016). The 
welfare reforms to date9 have disproportionately affected social groups that already occupy a 
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vulnerable class position, exposing them to reduced subsistence income and punitive sanctions (JRF, 
2014). They have an additional stratifying effect in highlighting a negative status position of 
dependency, extended under UC to include receipt of low-wage supplements, while imposing a 
cumulative disciplinary regime on claimants through the detail of policy design and implementation.  
Welfare eligibility in Britain does not require a contribution record, but over the period 2010 to the 
present, has increasingly engaged moves towards greatly enhanced conditions for the unemployed that 
intensify with the duration of a claim10, and carry incremental sanctions for failure to comply 
(Webster, 2015). In the name of deficit reduction, all working age benefits have been frozen for four 
years from April 201611, following earlier differential freezes and limits on up-ratings, a monetary cap 
has been placed on total household benefit income, and various cuts imposed on Housing Benefit and 
Council Tax Benefit. A further stratum of change has been directed at support for the low paid, 
reducing the earnings allowed before triggering a benefit reduction, while conditionality for the new 
UC will compel low earners to seek more hours or better pay. ‘Activation’ policies have also been 
heightened for disabled claimants deemed capable of work, and for lone parents.  
One further stratifying effect has been geographical. Vastly uneven cuts to local authority spending 
over the period 2010 to 2015 have meant an average fall of 23.4 per cent per person, rising to over 45 
per cent in the hardest hit authorities (Becker et al, 2016; Crewe, 2016). These cuts have directly 
affected some benefits, while also falling most strongly on areas of pre-existing deprivation. 
EEA nationals and benefit entitlement 
While all migrants acquire full social rights on achieving permanent residence, stratifying techniques 
of control have long been deployed to cover the intervening period. From 2010 onwards (Gower, 
2015) non-EEA migration has increasingly been managed by income and skill thresholds, as well as 
pre-existing welfare exclusions, but this left EEA nationals who were exercising freedom of 
movement under Directive 2004/38/EC and who had stabilised at around half of all trans-national 
migrants. Under this Directive, EEA workers and jobseekers are entitled to equal treatment in relation 
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to benefits facilitating access to the labour market, but the UK government has sought to deter their 
presence by stratified devices of control that make the fullest use of permitted restrictions. Here we 
see a direct link between discourse and policy, in an elaboration of the fairness and responsibilities 
agenda designed to target FM of workers within the EU.  
Britain had already imposed transitional restrictions on labour market and benefit access for Bulgarian 
and Romanian (A2) workers for the maximum permitted period of seven years, and in 2013 David 
Cameron turned public attention to the alleged ‘abuse’ of FM, with the A2 restrictions due to end later 
that year. The ensuing measures to limit out-of-work benefits for EEA nationals were rushed through 
in regulations governing their access, effective from January 2014, and announced in Press releases 
that quote directly from Cameron’s speeches. They purported to reduce ‘the magnetic pull of Britain’s 
benefit system’12 and to address the concerns of ‘the hardworking British public’13 (Cameron, 2014a) 
– many of whom were themselves subject to austerity measures aimed at deficit reduction.  
When Cameron promised that ‘no one can come to this country and expect to get out-of-work benefits 
immediately...(that) we will no longer pay these indefinitely’, and that FM ‘cannot be completely 
unqualified’ (Cameron, 2013a) he was clearly referring to EEA workers. This partly reflects a concern 
about the non-contributory nature of most benefits, which is a feature of the UK system itself. In fact, 
FM within the EU has never been entirely unconditional,14 but recent UK policy has strained at the 
boundary of what is permissible (O’Brien, 2015) with a view to limiting access to benefits, deterring 
arrivals, and addressing the so-called ‘abuse’ of FM (Cameron, 2014b). However, while the measures 
introduced were intended to reassure the ‘British public’, they equally served to highlight an alleged 
‘problem’ that could be ameliorated but not eradicated while Britain remained in the EU. 
Targeting EEA job-search, key measures (Kennedy, 2015) included a requirement of 3 months prior 
residence for jobseekers allowance (JSA – unemployment benefit), and its extension to Child Benefit 
and Child Tax Credits. From January 2014 onwards15 there was a statutory six month limit on JSA 
claims by new EEA jobseekers and previous (retained) workers, later reduced to three months for 
jobseekers. A genuine prospect of work test is applied to the latter group after three months, and for 
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retained workers after six months, while failure means a loss of the right to reside that in turn 
rebounds on the path to permanent residence. A minimum earnings threshold has been introduced to 
the designation of worker status, new jobseekers have been excluded from eligibility for Housing 
Benefit, and in March 2015 Parliament passed regulations to exclude EEA jobseekers from eligibility 
for UC.  
These widely publicised measures16 were designed to limit migrant access to benefits and discourage 
EEA migration to Britain, but in practice focused attention on a ‘problem’ that scarcely existed. Thus, 
Favell (2014:286) notes ‘the government’s inability to marshal any evidence in support of its own 
official position’, and observes that such anti-EU argument is emotional and not empirical. 
Rhetoric or reality? 
It is therefore important to consider how far the world view constructed by political discourse and 
advanced by associated policy measures addressed an actually existing problem, supported by 
empirical evidence. The discourse and policy package outlined thus far rests on two (somewhat 
conflicting) claims – that domestic welfare dependency is in part attributable to the presence of 
migrant workers; and that EEA migrants are drawn to Britain by the availability of welfare benefits, 
and are thus a drain on resources. In fact, data from official sources support neither claim, and the 
Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR, 2013, Annex A) notes that the main effect of a rise in net 
migration is to increase labour supply, bring higher returns on capital, increase investment, and 
improve the debt to GDP ratio. 
A variety of studies (eg. Lemos and Portes, 2008; Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), 2014; Ruhs 
and Vargas-Silva, 2015) show only minimal displacement of British workers, and even confining 
attention to low skilled migrants, the Chair of the government’s MAC (Metcalf, 2016, section 6) 
concluded: ‘(they) have a neutral impact on UK-born employment rates, fiscal contribution, GDP per 
head and productivity’. The MAC (2014) also reports only slight downward pressure on wages for 
UK born workers in semi/unskilled work (cf. Devlin et al, 2014), calculated by Portes to amount to 1 
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per cent over 8 years17, not least because of protection offered by minimum wage legislation. Against 
this background, the MAC crucially registers a need to address the gap between public perceptions 
and reality, which they argue can lead to poor policy choices.  
So if EEA migrants were not displacing British workers, were they excessively dependent on welfare 
benefits? In fact, available data does not come close to supporting the political discourse. In the year 
before restrictions were imposed, EU migrants accounted for 4 per cent of all JSA claims, and 2.1 per 
cent of all working age benefit claims18 (Keen and Turner, 2016), while making up 4.8 per cent of the 
workforce19. Though Tax Credit receipt for EU migrants is proportionately higher than for British 
workers, at 14 per cent as compared with 11 per cent (Keen and Turner, 2016), official figures show 
that EU arrivals over the four years to 2016 paid £2.54bn more in income tax and National Insurance 
than they received in Tax Credits or Child Benefit.20 Yet urgent measures rushed through to address 
the ‘problem’ of benefit tourism inevitably foster the opposite impression, undermining the ‘moral 
standing’ of the target group, and with it support for EU membership. 
Moral standing  
We have seen above how civic stratification can operate through formal status distinctions that govern 
both welfare eligibility for the domestic population, and conditions of entry and stay for migrants. 
However, the management of public perceptions and sentiment accompanying patterns of entitlement 
will in turn operate through informal distinctions of desert, underpinned by what we might term moral 
standing in society. Indeed, in addition to the construction of formal statuses determining differential 
access to rights, Lockwood’s (1996) schema points to the role of ‘moral and material resources’ in 
both the legitimation and effects of civic stratification. Moral resources refer to ‘advantages conferred 
by social standing and social networks’, and most crucially for the present argument ‘the ability to 
attain one’s ends through the activation of shared moral sentiments’ (p36).  
The influence of moral resources in Lockwood’s account serves as a vehicle for civic expansion 
through claims for enhanced treatment in the delivery of rights, or mobilisations for the creation of 
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new rights, but he neglects to consider the reverse dynamic of contraction. Attributions of blame, 
allegations of abuse, and a questioning of desert, all negatively affect perceptions of legitimacy and 
thereby moral standing, and we have seen this process at work in political discourse addressing both 
domestic welfare claims, and the rights of FM in Europe. This discourse and related policy measures 
then feed public perceptions that radically misjudge the scale of the ‘problems’ in question.21 In fact, 
the discourse and policy designed to limit social rights – whether through enhanced conditionality for 
domestic claimants, or the campaign against benefit tourism from the EU - are a more plausible 
source of any related ‘moral panic’22 than substantial evidence of abuse or significant resource drain. 
The effect has been to present EU migrants as competitors in a struggle over shrinking resources, 
rather than as net contributors who are the latest target of a shift in the nature and purpose of welfare 
protection. Their legitimacy and desert are thus placed in question and their moral standing impaired. 
Lockwood argues that institutional structures for delivering the rights that are central to social 
integration may also affect class formation (or class de-formation), and political discourse has not 
only condemned domestic welfare claimants and EU migrants, but has set them against each other. 
Within an increasingly ‘flexible’ labour market (Inman, 2016; Forsey and Field, 2016) we have seen 
enhanced welfare conditionality and sanctions for both out-of-work and in-work benefits, 
accompanied by discursive oppositions between welfare dependents, migrants, and hardworking 
taxpayers, and supplemented by accusations of benefit tourism and abuse of FM. Thus, for both 
domestic welfare recipients and EEA migrants an attack on moral standing by means of political 
rhetoric has been a prelude to increased conditionality in the delivery or denial of rights, while also 
fuelling the scope for resentment towards the latter group.   
Government rhetoric on migration and benefits has been misleading with respect to both the level of 
claims and their likely duration, and several bodies note the lack of supporting data (MAC, 2014; 
NIESR, 201523; House of Lords written question HL4654), or even significant labour market 
displacement (Devlin et al, 2014). Indeed, the Council of Europe24 has highlighted the need for a more 
nuanced and evidence based public narrative on these issues, while Wadsworth (2015) observes that 
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the key significance of immigration lies less in its empirical effects than in its impact on public 
perceptions. But as Munch has observed, it is the rhetoric itself that shapes the way problems are 
perceived and tackled, and in this context, the promise of phased-in access to Tax Credits for new 
arrivals - the most relevant aspect of Cameron’s EU negotiations - looked ineffectual. Given the 
government discourse on domestic welfare, migration, and benefit tourism, Britain’s attempt to secure 
concessions on FM - themselves constrained by EU law, served to confirm these problems in the 
public eye and further erode the moral standing of EU migrants.  
Questions could be raised about the extent to which migrants and domestic welfare claimants might 
make common cause (Migrant Rights Network;25 Metcalf, 2016) – non-standard workers gain from 
EU level employment protection (JRF, 2016), and a number of ‘cross-over’ issues affect the two 
groups. Both have been exposed to exploitation in a ‘flexible’ and poorly regulated labour market 
(MAC, 2014, Metcalf, 2016; Field and Forsey, 2016); both are affected by austerity measures in the 
operation of the welfare system; both experience increased conditionality and surveillance in 
accessing their rights; and both groups suffer from the erosion of public services associated with 
reductions in local authority funding (Crewe, 2016). However, one key to understanding public 
perceptions must be the political construction of a world view based on a vision of limited good, 
whereby the presence and rights of migrants detract from the resources and opportunities available to 
the domestic population.  
Reflections on the Brexit vote 
The results of the referendum are well known. Leave succeeded on 51.9 per cent of the vote26 (Becker 
et al, 2016), based on a broad coalition of three different groups - Eurosceptics (23 per cent of the 
population, 75 per cent voting leave), the older working class (16 per cent of the population, 73 per 
cent voting leave), and an economically deprived anti-immigrant group (12 per cent of the population, 
95 per cent voting leave) (Swales et al, 2016). The Leave vote was in practice multi-faceted, but much 
attention has focussed on low income and low skilled groups living in deprived areas – the ‘left 
behind’ (eg. Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Sensier and Devine, 2017), in part because these 
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circumstances make for unstable sentiments, open to persuasion from differing political positions 
(Munch, 2012:251). For these voters, the backdrop to the result was arguably sketched out in 
Cameron’s discourse on welfare and migration, and their mutual associations.  
The referendum happened in the context of an austerity drive geared to deficit reduction, a 
government discourse condemning EU migrants’ indefinite and immediate benefit entitlement, 
increased precarity of employment (Field and Forsey, 2016), and a lack of wage growth at the lower 
levels (Allen and Elliott, 2016). While the most direct link in the discourse was made between 
unemployment and migration, British workers facing insecurity, cuts to Tax Credits, and attacks on 
dependency would also be vulnerable to an argument that foregrounded ‘fairness’ but left them 
precariously placed. Aggregate summaries of the vote and analysis at local authority level all paint the 
same picture, with low income a key predictor of the Leave vote (Goodwin and Heath, 2016), together 
with a sense of worsening personal circumstances relative to others (Swales, 2016), especially notable 
given benefit cuts and freezes. At highly disaggregated ward level27 deprivation correlated strongly 
with support for Leave, which was also characterised by high unemployment, low income, and a 
traditional reliance on manufacturing (Becker et al, 2016; Beatty and Fothergill, 2016).  
Becker et al (2016) stress the multi-causal nature of the result, arguing that explanatory power will 
come only from understanding on a variety of dimensions, and this is apparent in a delicate balance 
between value based and resource based factors in proffered accounts. While documenting and 
endorsing the socio-economic correlations noted above, Goodwin and Heath (2016) point to a pre-
existing value conflict that underpinned earlier growth in support for the UK Independence Party. In 
this scenario, political and media elites espouse support for social liberalism, multi-culturalism and 
EU membership, while left-behind social groups are united by a more nativist response to perceived 
threats of rapid social and cultural change. Goodwin and Heath (2016:31) then argue that as a result 
these groups have ‘long felt excluded from the mainstream consensus and used the referendum to 
voice their distinctive views.’  
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Becker et al (2016) similarly stress the explanatory power of what they term ‘political’ factors28, but 
also point to the uneven burden of fiscal consolidation to argue that the referendum result was at least 
partially related to distributional issues. Indeed, a mapping of the vote confirms that cuts to both 
welfare and local authority funding, each strongly associated with entrenched deprivation (Beatty and 
Fothergill, 2016; Becker et al, 2016), correlate closely with support for Leave. By 2015, the areas 
worst hit by benefit cuts were losing four times as much per year per working age adult as the least 
affected, and were typically older industrial areas and deprived seaside towns (Beatty and Fothergill, 
2016) - precisely the terrain of support for Leave. Becker et al (2016) additionally point to local 
authority spending cuts (which also affect some benefits), and found that authorities experiencing a 
higher level of cuts were more likely to favour Leave, in part because the geographical pattern of loss 
coincides with other pre-existing deprivations. They observe that voters may have inadvertently 
weighed the cost of EU membership against the sizeable extent of domestic welfare and benefits cuts, 
and turned away – a response endorsed by resigned cabinet minister Iain Duncan-Smith (2016). 
Fiscal consolidation and entrenched disadvantage thus provide the context for what Goodwin and 
Heath term a values conflict, and together they help to make sense of one superficially surprising 
aspect of the referendum results. Swales et al (2016) found concern about immigration levels to be the 
biggest single factor distinguishing Leave and Remain supporters, though in fact areas with the 
highest level of migration expressed least concern and tended to favour Remain, while the strongest 
Leave areas were generally those with the smallest migrant populations.29 Goodwin and Heath (2016), 
however, found that it is the rate of change that affected people’s vote, a rapid rate being associated 
with Leave – even at low overall levels of migrant presence. This specifically applies to the inflow of 
East European migrants over the last ten years, a group of migrants who are more geographically 
dispersed than previous arrivals,30 and Becker et al (2016) note a likely interaction effect when an 
increased flow of lower skilled migrants into a disadvantaged local population coincides with 
exposure to welfare reform and spending cuts. 
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While this offers a recipe for strong Leave support, we should also look to the political environment 
in which these effects operate31 and attention to this background can amplify aggregate analysis of 
voting patterns of the ‘left behind’ to provide a more dynamic understanding of their position. In fact, 
the circumstances favouring support for Leave were significantly enhanced by the policies and 
discourse promoted by David Cameron from 2010 onwards, such that his aim to ‘change the way we 
think about ourselves’ militated against his Remain agenda. We have seen a condemnation of 
dependency in the domestic population (for both in-work and out-of-work benefits), heightened cuts 
and conditionality in their benefits, a claimed association between welfare dependency and migration, 
and unfounded assertions about the abuse of FM and benefit tourism. In sum, a section of the 
domestic population whose moral resources are weak and whose moral standing has been 
systematically impugned, have seen their welfare rights eroded and their living standards fall, and 
have classically been offered a target to blame - albeit one that flies in the face of empirical evidence. 
The ‘just about managing’ 
When Theresa May assumed the position of Prime Minister she seemed to speak directly to the 
concerns of the ‘left behind’, announcing a mission to make Britain ‘a country that works for 
everyone’ (May, 2016), and promising to deliver a society with ‘fairness and solidarity at its heart’ 
(May, 2017). She appealed in particular to people ‘working around the clock’ and only ‘just about 
managing’ (JAMs), but a close reading of her early speeches (see appendix) shows more consistency 
with the Cameron discourse than at first appears. Her ‘Shared Society’ speech (May, 2017) 
acknowledged a need to support the vulnerable, but the focus was her promise ‘to help those who 
have been ignored by the government for too long because they don’t fall into the income bracket that 
makes them qualify for welfare support’. Thus, while there was no overt attack on dependency 
culture, the old dividing lines remain in place – as do the benefit cuts and freezes.  
In fact, cuts currently unfolding particularly affect supplements for the low paid and for families with 
children32 and raise questions about who exactly are the JAMs. However, fairness is again a rallying 
cry for those ‘out of work or on lower wages because of low-skilled migration’ (May, 2016a), and so 
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too is the ‘injustice’ experienced by those ‘who see others prospering while (they) are not’ and whose 
‘very identity’ is under threat (May, 2017). ‘Brexit means Brexit’ (May, 2016a) promises them a 
reclamation of sovereign independence, a rejection of half-way-house measures, and a resumption of 
control over immigration. However, with frozen benefits, stagnant wages, a falling pound, and rising 
inflation33 – plus eventual loss of EU funds, many seem set to be disappointed, especially in the Brexit 
voting areas of economic disadvantage34. 
Conclusion 
This article began by viewing government speeches for the period 2010-16 as the expression of a 
moralising discourse rooted in conceptions of fairness, responsibility and protection for the 
hardworking taxpayer. Such discourse has been the basis for an erosion of social rights through 
increased conditionality and deteriorating living standards, while its extension from welfare to 
migration has placed domestic welfare recipients in an ambiguous position. Condemned for their own 
dependency, they have nevertheless been deemed unfairly subject to the impacts of migration. 
Although available empirical evidence is far from supporting the discursive claims and policy changes 
that came to focus on the position of EU migrants, it is argued here that the Brexit vote is at least in 
part the outcome of a zero-sum vision that sets domestic welfare recipients (in and out of work) and 
EU migrants in opposition.  
While the Brexit process is by its nature unique, it illustrates several points of general interest, not 
least in offering a particular case study of what has been termed the liberal competition state, and the 
shifting contours of welfare, economy and solidarity within a changing global division of labour. The 
account above thus documents the reconfiguration of welfare in a country retreating from the 
Marshallian ideal of social inclusion while increasingly reluctant to embrace the construction of a 
post-national Europe. In so doing it documents an instance of the turn away from collectivised 
protection to individualised activation and deterrence, respectively targeting domestic welfare 
dependency and freedom of movement within the EU. 
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The study provides an illustration of the significance of what Munch (2012) terms the symbolic 
struggle in relation to welfare, economy and migration, showing the importance of political rhetoric in 
constructing the potential for affinities and divisions both within the domestic population, and 
between the ‘left behind’ and in-coming migrants. In constructing this account, it has been argued that 
an understanding of the dynamic in play could be further advanced by the concept of civic 
stratification. This concept is used here to extend a purely discursive approach by both tracing the 
formal translation from discourse to policy, and outlining a subsequent informal impact on the moral 
standing of its targets. The absence of evidence to support key elements of the policy is significant, 
and illustrates the role of discourse in creating the appearance of a problem to be solved – in this case 
the welfare/migration configuration. While the Brexit vote has sometimes been understood as a value 
conflict between the ‘left behind’ and a more distant liberal elite (Goodwin and Heath, 2016), that 
conflict was actively fuelled by a discourse and policy intended to shore up support for Remain. The 
outcome thus stands as a perverse effect of so forcefully pitting FM in Europe against the interests of 
domestic welfare recipients, in a bid to reform but remain in the EU. 
Though Brexit stands as a peculiarly British phenomenon, the analysis offered here presents some 
points that could prove relevant for other Member States. It illustrates the political volatility that can 
emerge when internal inequality, falling living standards, identity, and sovereignty are in play, and 
when immigration is perceived or presented as a crisis issue. A popular call for national policies that 
speak to these concerns potentially undermines the scope for cohesion at EU level, and the whole 
combination is ripe for exploitation by appeal to a national group or groups who feel that their 
interests are not well represented. The account above points to the ease with which political discourse 
can over-ride empirical data, the significance of political rhetoric in shaping the way problems are 
perceived and tackled (cf. Munch, 2012), and the ready availability of migrants as a focal point for 
discontent. One especially notable feature of the British story for other Member States is the way a 
desire to address perceptions of national discontent displaced any more positively framed case to 
Remain in the EU, and instead drove an active retreat from some of its core principles. 
22 
 
References 
Allen, K and Elliott, L (2016) ‘Britain at bottom of league as real wages decline by 10%’, Guardian, 
27 July 
Anderson, B. (2013) Us and Them, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Beatty, C. and Fothergill, S. (2016) The Uneven Impact of Welfare Reform, Sheffield: Sheffield 
Hallam, CRESR 
Becker, S.O., Fetzer, T. And Novy, D. (2016) Who Voted for Brexit, Warwick: Centre for 
Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy, Working Paper 305 
Beitz, C.R. (1983) ‘Cosmopolitan ideals and national sentiment’, Journal of Philosophy 80(10):591-
600 
Booth, W.J. (1994) ‘On the idea of the moral economy’, American Political Science Review 
88(3):653-67. 
Clarke, J. and Newman, J. (2012) ‘The alchemy of austerity’, Critical Social Policy 32(3):299-319 
Conservative Party (2008) Work for Welfare, Consultation Paper 
Crewe, T. (2016) ‘The strange death of municipal England’, London Review of Books, 15 December 
Deckard, N.D. and Heslin, A. (2016) ‘After post-national citizenship’, Sociology Compass 10(4) 294-
305 
Devlin, C. Bolt, O., Patel, D., Harding, D. And Hussain, I. (2014) Impact of Migration on UK Native 
Employment, London: Home Office/Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Occasional Paper 
109 
Duevell, F. and Jordan, B. (2002) ‘Immigration, asylum and welfare’, Critical Social Policy 
22(3):498-517 
DWP (2010), 21st Century Welfare, Cm 7971. 
DWP (2010a), Universal Credit: Welfare that Works,  Cm 7957. 
Fassin, D. (2009) ‘Moral economies revisited’, Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 64(6):1237-66 
Favell, A. (2014) ‘The fourth freedom’, European Journal of Social Theory 17(3):275-87 
23 
 
Field, F. and Forsey, A. (2016)  
http://www.frankfield.co.uk/upload/docs/Wild%20West%20Workplace.pdf    
Freeden, M. 1996 Ideologies and Political Theory, Oxford: OUP. 
Freeden, M. 2003 Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: OUP. 
Freeman, G. (1986) ‘Migration and the political economy of the welfare state’, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 534 July:17-30 
Geddes, A. (2003) ‘Migration and the welfare state in Europe’, The Political Quarterly 74(1):150-62 
Goodwin, M. and Heath, D. (2016) ‘The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind’, The Political 
Quarterly 87(3) 323-32 
Gower, M. (2015) Immigration and Asylum: changes made by the Coalition Government 2010-15, 
London: House of Commons Library, SN/HA/5829 
Hitlin, S. and Vaisey, S. (2013) ‘The new sociology of morality’, Annual Review of Sociology 39:51-
68. 
Inman, P. (2016) ‘Flexibility is the new injustice inflicted on the working class’, Observer, 22 May 
JRF (2014) Welfare Sanctions and Conditionality in the UK, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
Keen, R. and Turner, R. (2016) Statistics on Migrants and Benefits, London: House of Commons 
Library, BP 7445 
Kennedy, S. (2015) Measures to Limit Migrants’ Access to Benefits, London: House of Commons 
Library, BP 06889 
Kofman, E. (2002) ‘Contemporary European migrations, civic stratification and citizenship, Political 
Geography 21(8):1035-54 
Laclau, E. (2014) The Rhetorical Foundations of Society, London: Verso. 
Lemos, S. and Portes, J. (2008) New Labour? The Impact of Labour from Central and European 
Countries on the UK Labour Market, Bonn: IZA, Discussion Paper 3756 
Lockwood, D. (1996) ‘Civic integration and class formation’, British Journal of Sociology 47(3):531-
50 
MAC  (2014) Migrants in Low-skilled Work, London: Home Office 
Marshall, T.H. (1950) Citizenship and Social Class, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
24 
 
Mau, S. (2003) The Moral Economy of Welfare States, London: Routledge 
Metcalf, D. (2016) Work, Immigration and the Labour Market, London: LSE 
Morris, L.D. (1997) ‘A cluster of contradictions’, Sociology 31(2):241-59 
Morris, L.D. (1998) ‘Governing at a distance’, International Migration Review 32(4):949-73 
Morris, L.D. (2002) Managing Migration, London: Routledge 
Munch, R (2012) Inclusion and Exclusion in the Liberal Competition State, London: Routledge 
O’Brien, C. ‘The pillory, the precipice and the slippery slope’, Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law 37(1):111-36 
OBR (2013) Fiscal Sustainability Report, London: HMSO 
Ruhs, M. and Vargas-Silva, C. (2015) The Labour Market Effects of Immigration, Oxford: Migration 
Observatory 
Sainsbury, D. (2012) Welfare States and Immigrant Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Sayer, A. (2007) ‘Moral economy as critique’, New Political Economy 12(2):261-270. 
Sensier, M. and Devine, F. (2017) ‘Social Mobility and Brexit’ Economics Discussion Paper Series, 
EDP-1709, Manchester: University of Manchester   
Soysal, Y. (2012) ‘Citizenship, immigration and the European social project’, British Journal of 
Sociology 63(1):1-21 
Swales, K. (2016) Understanding the Leave Vote, London: NatCen 
Thompson, E.P. (1971) ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd’, Past and Present 50(Feb):76-
136.  
TUC (2016) Living on the Edge, London: TUC 
Wadsworth, J. (2015) Immigration and the UK Labour Market, Paper EA019, London: Centre for 
Economic Performance (LSE) 
Webster, D. (2015) https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/resources/benefit-sanctions-britains-secret-
penal-system  
 
25 
 
Footnotes 
                                                          
1
 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/jul/01/duncan-smith-appeals-businesses-employ-young-
britons 
2
 David Cameron holds the worst house building record since 1923 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-housing-housebuilding-prime-
minister-england-john-healey-a7144646.html  
3
 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/accelerating-action-to-stop-rogue-eu-benefit-claims  
4
 An estimated 2% of total claims 
5
 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/accelerating-action-to-stop-rogue-eu-benefit-claims  
6
 For a list of changes see 
http://www.npi.org.uk/files/7613/7477/4989/Table_of_changes_to_welfare.pdf, and 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-welfare-reform/2010-
to-2015-government-policy-welfare-reform  
7
 See https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/fact-check-43-eu-migrants-claim-benefits  
8
 Currently being phased in, to integrate Job Seekers Allowance, Housing Benefit, Working Tax 
Credit, Child Tax Credit, Employment Support Allowance (for the disabled), and Income Support (for 
the economically inactive). 
9
 See note 7  
10
 Eg differential requirements for participation in the Work Programme. 
11
 http://www.entitledto.co.uk/help/Benefit_Changes_April_2016. See also note 6 
12
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10995875/David-Cameron-Were-building-
an-immigration-system-that-puts-Britain-first.html  
13
 Eg. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/accelerating-action-to-stop-rogue-eu-benefit-claims  
14
 See https://www.freemovement.org.uk/brexit-briefing-rights-of-entry-and-residence/  
15
 Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/1511) and SI 
(2014/2761)   
16
 See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/accelerating-action-to-stop-rogue-eu-benefit-claims   
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 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/tough-new-migrant-benefit-rules-come-into-force-tomorrow 
17
 http://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/how-small-small-impact-immigration-uk-wages#.WFQJTLmQKCk  
18
 http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7445 The main working 
age benefits are JSA (for unemployment), ESA (for disability) and Income Support (for economically 
inactive) 
19
 https://www.ft.com/content/ac4f8ace-1cf6-11e6-b286-cddde55ca122  
20
 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/20/reality-check-are-eu-migrants-really-taking-
british-jobs 
21
 On perceptions of benefit fraud see http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/voters-
brainwashed-by-tory-welfare-myths-shows-new-poll-8437872.html, and on migrant access to welfare 
see https://www.ipsos-mori.com/DownloadPublication/1634_sri-perceptions-and-reality-immigration-
report-2013.pdf  chapter 3. 
22
 See https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/fact-check-43-eu-migrants-claim-benefits and 
compare with  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3467563/886million-eye-watering-sum-pay-
benefits-work-EU-migrants-just-one-year.html  
23
 http://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/coalition-government%E2%80%99s-record-immigration  
24
 https://blogs.ec.europa.eu/ECintheUK/getting-the-facts-straight-eu-rights-to-reside-in-another-
member-state-eu-benefit-claimants-and-nhs-treatment-entitlement/   
25
 http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/blog/2016/06/or-out-eu-it-global-labour-markets-drive-migration-
todays-world   
26
 53.4% in England, with Scotland and Northern Ireland supporting Remain (Sensier andDevine, 
2017) 
27
 An electoral unit of average population 7000, analysed by Becker et al (2016) for four cities 
 
28
 Prior support for the UK Independence Party or the British National Party 
 
29
 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/voting-details-show-immigration-fears-were-
paradoxical-but-decisive  
30
 http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/pa015.pdf  
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31
 Notably the Scottish vote (62 per cent Remain) displayed a different pattern of response. 
32
 http://guardian.newspaperdirect.com/epaper/viewer.aspx  
33
 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/01/brexit-vote-cost-niesr-economic-growth  
34
 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/nov/09/brexit-will-hit-northern-england-economy-hardest-
ippr-north-thinktank  
